Deep learning is gaining importance in many applications. However, neural networks face several security and privacy threats. This is particularly significant in the scenario where Cloud infrastructures deploy a service with neural network model at the back end. Here, an adversary can extract the neural network parameters, infer the regularization hyperparameter, identify if a data point was part of the training data, and generate effective transferable adversarial examples to evade classifiers. This paper shows how a neural network model is susceptible to timing side channel attack. In this paper, a black box neural network extraction attack is proposed by exploiting the timing side channels to infer the depth of the network. Although, constructing an equivalent architecture is a complex search problem, it is shown how the reinforcement learning with knowledge distillation can effectively reduce the search space to infer a target model. The proposed approach has been tested with VGG(Visual Geometry Group) architectures on CIFAR10 data set. It is observed that it is possible to reconstruct substitute models with test accuracy close to the target models and the proposed approach is scalable and independent of type of neural network architectures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Of late, neural networks have been successfully employed to many diversified areas, namely computer vision, natural language processing, business intelligence, etc. These neural networks and machine learning models are deployed in the Cloud as a service to the customers on a pay-per-query basis. Deep learning architectures have also been deployed for automated critical decision making in security applications like national critical infrastructures, malware and intrusion detection. For various military applications like unmanned combat aerial vehicle, automated target recognition and guided missile systems, the underlying decision making depends on state of the art deep learning architectures. Banks and financial organisations rely on deep learning to process the massive financial data.
The commercial value of these models make them an intellectual property for the company and are kept confidential as a black box while deployed as a service to the customers. These black box models do not reveal any information to the service users other than the predictions for the input. The commercial benefits make the black box neural networks attractive to adversaries to extract the models and circumvent the pay-per-query setting of the service or use it to evade security systems like malware and intrusion detection systems. Given the architecture of the neural networks, an attacker can further mount various privacy and security attacks like model inversion [12] [11] [16] and power side channel attacks [38] [5] to extract the inputs and generate more accurate adversarial example to evade classifiers during test time [30] . These attacks violate the privacy of the sensitive data used for training the models or result in wrong decision making.
Key Challenges in Model Extraction Attacks. In the black box setting, the attacker has only access to the output predictions given input and lacks any knowledge about the model and the training data. Previous model extraction attacks have relied on using output predictions to infer the architecture attributes. Nevertheless, this requires a large number of queries [36] , large number of models to learn the input output mapping [29] or knowledge about the model structure [30] . Further, querying the gradients of the model requires a significantly large number of queries which grow with the size of the architecture and does not reconstruct the model with a high accuracy [28] . On the other hand, side channels like power consumption [5] , memory access patterns [18] , cache side channel attacks [39] [17] , etc. require escalated attacker privileges or physical access to hardware. In this work, an attack in a black box setting to exploit timing side channels and reconstruct a target model architecture with a constant number of queries has been proposed.
Approach. The objective of model extraction attack is to search for a substitute model with similar functionality as the target neural architecture. However, the search space for the substitute model is very complex and large due to the large number of hyperparameters in neural networks. To make the search tractable and efficient, the adversary has to reduce the search space by identifying some of the attributes of the target neural network in a black box setting using minimum queries. In a black box setting, a weak adversary can obtain the output prediction corresponding to a given input image. This paper shows the existence of timing side channels in the black box setting due to the dependence of the total execution time of the neural network with the number of layers. From the total execution time, an adversary can infer the total number of layers(depth) of the neural network using a regressor trained on the data with the variation of execution time with neural network depth. This additional side channel information obtained, namely the depth of the network, reduces the search space for finding the substitute model with functionality close to the target model. To efficiently search for the optimal neural network, reinforcement learning based neural architecture search is proposed which predicts an architecture using the reward from the performance of the previous proposed models [41] . Within the proposed reinforcement learning paradigm, knowledge distillation is used to train the substitute models where the loss function is computed using the predicted labels of the substitute model and the target model instead of the true labels [15] . This ensures that the substitute model learns to mimic the predictions of the target model and hence, reducing the difference between the two models. This reconstruction approach can be used with other attack approaches as well, like cache side channel attacks [17] [39] .
The proposed approach assumes a weak adversary with only black box access to the target neural network and requires a constant number of queries to infer the neural network depth which is independent of the architecture size. Further, the objective function of reinforcement learning approach maximises the accuracy of the proposed substitute neural network which ensures that the proposed neural networks are optimal.
Evaluation. For evaluating the attack, the performance of different regressors, to infer the neural network depth given the execution time, has been assessed based on the R 2 score and the Mean Squared Error. From the results, ensemble based regressors like random forrest and boosted decision trees outperform their counterparts: Ridge regression, Support Vector Machine(SVM) and decision trees. The evaluation of reinforcement learning based reconstruction is done using deep convolutional neural networks similar to VGG architectures [33] . The proposed search technique can generate a model with test accuracy within 5% of the target model.
Main Contributions. The paper makes the following main contributions:
• Shows that neural networks are vulnerable to timing side channel attacks and neural network architectures with different depth have different execution time(Section V). • Proposes a novel attack to infer the depth of the Neural network using timing side channels in constant number of queries in a black box setting(Section VI). • Proposes an efficient search technique for optimal substitute architecture using reinforcement learning with knowledge distillation with functionality similar to the target model(Section VII).
II. BACKGROUND

A. Neural Networks
Let (x, y) be the data points obtained by sampling from a probability distribution D over the space X of input feature values and space Y of output labels. The mapping from X to Y is captured by a function f : X → Y . The associated loss function l f : X × Y → R captures the error made by the prediction f (x) when the true label is y. Deep Neural networks are modelled as such functions f h (x, θ) where θ are the parameters optimised during training to obtain minimum expected loss under the constraint of the hyperparameters h. The set of hyperparameters h includes the depth of the neural network, stride and filter size of convolution and maxpool layers and regularization hyperparameters. The performance of the neural networks is measured by computing the accuracy on test data in classification tasks.
B. Security and Privacy in Machine Learning
Machine learning has several security and privacy issues in adversarial setting [10] . Adversarial examples are data instances that fool the classifier into misclassifying the image by either poisoning the training data or evading the decision logic during inference [30] . For a neural network function f h (x; θ) with input data point x and parameters θ, an adversary can violate the confidentiality of input data(x), training data, model parameters(θ) and the model computation(f h (x; θ)). The input passed to the model can be extracted using model inversion attack [12] [11] [16] by computing the input given output, parameters and gradients or by exploiting power side channels from hardware accelerators [38] . Membership inference attacks violate the privacy of individual members of the training dataset by identifying whether a given data point is in the dataset or not [32] [31] . The computation of the neural networks leak information in the form of side channels which allow the adversary to extract model details or inputs [29] [5] . Machine learning models can be extracted by adversary to reconstruct a substitute model with similar functionality as the target model and hence violating the intellectual property of the service provider [36] [38] [37] . Some of these attacks assume that the underlying neural network architecture is known to the adversary.
Implementation and physical characteristics of systems expose information about the underlying computation which can be extracted in the form of side channels. Power consumption and Timing side channels are some common manifestations of side channel attacks overlooked during system design. While side channels like power channels are accurate and reveal significant information about the target architecture, they require expensive equipment and probes to monitor and measure the power consumption [23] . Timing Channels arise when the program uses branching or conditional statements dependent on the secret information which influences the runtime(external timing attacks) or when the access timing correlates strongly with the program locality dependent on the secret(internal timing attacks). Timing side channels have been used to exploit various cryptographic implementations including RSA, Diffie-Hellman [22] and OpenSSL [7] [6] .
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Model Extraction. Given a black box access to a target neural network f target , the goal of the adversary is to search for a substitute neural network f substitute ∈ S, where S is the search space for all possible neural network models with different hyperparameters, such that the functionality of f target approximates f substitute using minimum possible queries. The metric used to measure the functionality the models, f substitute and f target , is the test accuracy(R test ). In other words, the objective is to minimize the difference in test accuracy R test = (x,y)∈D d(f target (x)−f substitute (x)) 2 /|D| between the two models f target and f substitute for inputs(x, y) sampled from the data(D), i.e, (x, y) i.i.d ∼ D and d is the distance function between the two inputs.
Exploiting Timing Side Channels. To reduce the entropy of search space of possible neural network models and make the search more efficient, the adversary exploits the timing side channels to infer the number of layer from the execution time. For this, the adversary collects a dataset(D A ) with execution time(T ) and neural network depth(K) for various models by changing the number of parameters. Formally, given the attacker dataset D A = {(T 1 , K 1 ), · · · , (T N , K N )} of i.i.d. random variables, for a given depth of the target neural network(k) from the total execution time(t), the adversary estimates the regression function R(k) = E{K|T = t}.
Model Search. The estimated depth is used to constraint the search space to S k which is the set of all the neural network models of depth k. This allows the adversary to search for the substitute model f substitute in the search space S k instead of search space S where S k ⊂ S. However, the search space S k is parameterised by kernel size, stride and number of filters which still make the search space large. To make the search space tractable, the adversary uses reinforcement learning paradigm where the accuracy of the target model is included in the objective function as part of the reward, to search for neural networks with higher test accuracy.
IV. THREAT MODEL
Setting. There are two settings for machine learning in adversarial setting: white box and black box setting, based on the adversary's knowledge about the target system. In white box setting, the adversary has access to the underlying data, learning algorithms, architecture of the model, training parameters and target model architectures which allows the adversary to compute the output of the intermediate layers.
The proposed attack is in a black box setting where the adversary does not have access to the model internals and can only query the trained model and obtain the corresponding output predictions. This is the setting of machine learning as a service. The adversary is weak with no knowledge of the target model internals. An input to the target model is sent to measure the response time corresponding to the execution of the neural network. In black box setting, the adversary can only infer the depth of the network from the execution time as the adversary has no access to the model details. Unlike a black box adversary, a white box adversary has access to the model and given the depth of the model and adversary can compute the hyperparameters of the individual layers as well. This work however considers a black box setting which is more practical and interesting.
Hardware. The proposed attack is an inference time attack, where the trained target model has been deployed as a service to the users. During inference, CPUs and neural network accelerators are extensively used while GPUs are used for training neural network architectures [35] . Majority of machine learning Cloud service providers use CPUs [14] . The attack is evaluated using CPUs but the approach can be extended to other hardware accelerators as well. The adversary requires the same processor as the target model which can be openly obtained in most of the ML as a Service(MLaaS) platforms like Amazon Sagemaker and Facebook which heavily rely on CPUs for the inference and provide the hardware specifications[2] [3] . The target hardware or the service can be purchased by adversary to run the queries and generate the attack dataset which is a one time operation and done as part of the setup phase for the attack.
Data. For the data, the attack assumes a weak adversary with no knowledge about the training data and only knows the input-output dimensions and range of values they can take. The adversary samples data points from the underlying data distribution x ∼ D which is passed as a query to the target model from which the adversary obtains the model output posterior M(x). Given the output posterior of the model for the input, the attacker checks if the value of the maximum posterior is greater than a threshold(member of the training data D T ) or not(not a member of the training data D T )[31] [40] . This is done iteratively by sampling data points and using membership inference attacks to reconstruct the training data used by the target neural network. This is a one time operation and is done during the setup phase of the attack as described in Section VI.
V. TIMING CHANNELS IN NEURAL NETWORKS
This section shows the relation between execution time of neural networks and their dependence on various hyperparameters for different neural network layers. This dependence of the execution time on the neural network hyperparameters allows an adversary to infer the architecture details using the total execution time which forms the basis for the attack. A typical convolutional neural network has three main layers based on operations: convolution layer, maxpool layer and fully connected layer and each of the layer has stride, kernel size and number of filter as the hyperparameters.
Convolution. Convolution is a weighted sum operation which computes the multiplication of the parameters(θ (l) ij ) of layer l and the input feature map(z l−1 ij ) and adds the results, x
The execution time of convolution layers is proportional to the number of multiplications(shown in Figure 1 
where o w and o h are the output matrix width and height, c i and c o are the input and output number of channels and f h and f w represent the filter width and filter height [1] .
Maxpool. Maxpool computes the max of the k × k region of preceding layer feature map. Hence, the computation of maxpool depends on the number of filters of the feature map and the kernel size. The execution time increases with increasing filter size and increasing kernel size as shown in Figure 1 Figure 1(c) . The output size decreases with increasing stride resulting in a decrease in the execution time. Fully Connected. Fully connected layer performs a matrix vector multiplication between the parameters of the neural network and the input image map. Formally, the matrix vector multiplication of parameters θ (l) ij for layer l with the activation of previous layer z (l−1) j is given by x
Given two fully connected layers of input nodes m and output nodes n, the execution time varies linearly with the total number of multiplications, m × n and the linear relation can be seen in Figure 2(a) .
Variation with Depth. Neural Networks are embarrassingly parallel and all the computations in one layer can be executed in parallel to some extent which enables optimisations like model and data parallelism to improve the performance[9] [25] . However, due to sequential computation of neural networks, the total execution time is the sum of the execution time of individual layers. In Figure 2 (b) and Figure 2 (c), the execution time increases linearly with the increase in the network architecture depth. This forms the basis of the attack methodology to infer the depth of the neural network given the execution time.
Hardware Factors. While the neural networks fetch the data and parameters from the memory, the program could incur latencies during reading or storing data, contention of threads and inefficient caching. Since the hardware used for all the models is same, these factors effect the execution time of all the neural networks in the same manner.
VI. ATTACK METHODOLOGY
Typically, side channels reveal only a part of the secret in the target system and identifying the rest of the secret can be modelled as a search problem [39] .
The proposed attack is broadly divided into three phases as shown in Figure 3 :
• Setup: Adversary aggregates the attacker dataset by measuring the execution time of multiple models with different hyperparameters, on a particular hardware, to be used in the actual attack. This is a one time operation prior to the attack. • Attack: Adversary queries the target neural network and measures the total execution time. A regressor is trained on the attacker dataset which is used to infer the target neural network depth. • Reconstruction: Adversary searches for an optimal neural network with test accuracy close to that of the target 
A. Setup Phase
The adversary in this phase performs three tasks:
• Identifies the input data samples which belong to the training dataset of the target neural network. • Labels the input training instances using the target model predictions used for training the substitute model with knowledge distillation. • Creates a dataset variation in execution time for neural network architectures with different hyperparameters. Identifying Inputs using Membership Inference. Since, the attack assumes a weak adversary with no knowledge about the training data, the adversary needs to identify and generate data samples used as the training dataset. For this the adversary queries the target model with data samples x, and based on the model output posterior, determines if the data sample belongs to the training data D T of the target neural network or not by using a suitable threshold [31] . Given the knowledge of the data samples used as part target model training dataset, the adversary labels the input instances by passing them as a query to the target model and to train the substitute model.
Training Data for Substitute Model. Knowledge distillation improves the performance of the substitute model(f substitute ) by training it using the outputs labels of the target model for a given input, i.e, data sample (x i , f targeti (x i )), instead of using the true labels corresponding to the input, i.e, (x i , y i ) [15] [4] . To generate the data in this format, the adversary passes data inputs(x i ), generated from membership inference attack to the target neural network, to obtain the corresponding target model predictions f targeti (x i ) used as labels from training the substitute neural network. Training the substitute model using the target model predicts, allows the model to mimic the target model increasing the model similarity and performance.
Creating Attack Model Timing Dataset. The adversary populates the attack model dataset which contains the time taken for inference and corresponding depth of the neural networks along with the number of parameters for the corresponding model as shown in Table I . Formally, for different model architectures and depth(K), the attacker collectes the correspoding execution time(T ) to gnerate the attacker dataset For a given hardware, the setup phase is required to be performed only once and the collected data can then be used for stealing any model run on the same hardware.
B. Attack Phase
Query. The adversary sends queries to the target model and computes the overall execution time averaged across all the queries. Each query reveals the same information(execution time) about the neural networks and hence requires a constant number of queries, independent of the model architecture.
Regression. The average execution time measure from the target neural network(t) is used to estimate the depth of neural network(k) using regressor trained on the attack model dataset created during the setup phase, R(k) = E{K|T = t}.
C. Reconstruction Phase
The search space of all possible Neural Networks is very large and complex due to which designing the neural network manually is hard and requires optimal search strategies to reduce and simplify the search space. The depth of the neural network reduces the search space and the model exploration is automated using reinforcement learning which outputs the best model architecture in the constrained search space [41] . A Recurrent Neural Network(RNN) based controller predicts the hyperparameters of each layer in the template neural network sampled using the reward from the previous proposed architecture. The parameters of controller RNN θ c are optimised based on performance of the predicted architecture using policy gradient method. Formally, the controller predicts the architectures through actions a 1:T and the predicted model tries to achieve accuracy R which is used to compute the reward signal to train the controller. The goal is to maximise the expected accuracy of sampled architecture give by,
(1)
The training of each proposed model is done using knowledge distillation where the loss function for training the substitute model is the distillation L2 loss function [15] between the substitute model predictions(y template ) and target model(y target ) predictions instead of the true labels(y) for a given data point x D and is given as,
The substitute model mimics the target model which makes the search efficient and the model mimics the target neural network model (Figure 4 ). Data. For all the experiments, CIFAR10 dataset [24] is used which contains 60,000 32x32 colour images in 10 classes with around 6000 images per class and the classes are mutually exclusive. For training, 50,000 images are used while 10,000 images are used for testing.
Experiment Setup. The processor used for evaluation and experimentation is Intel Xeon Gold 5115 server processor with a 2.4GHz clock speed, 196GB of main memory and 40 cores. All the reported number are an average of 20 inference runs. Accurate timing of the neural network inference is done using process time() from the time() python library which computes the time interval for running the inference using the CPU counter and is not effected by execution of other unrelated processes. The clock has a tick rate(ticks/s) of 10,000,000 which indicates a high resolution of 1e-07.
A. Regression
The attacker dataset for training the regressor model is created using 100 neural networks with different depth and hyperaprameters. The scatter plot of that attacker dataset is shown in Figure 5 . A good regressor model should be able to capture and explain the variance of the dataset through its predictions and generalize well over the data samples. The evaluation of different regressor models on the attacker dataset is done using R 2 score metric to measure the variance explained by the model and the mean squared error(MSE) to measure the error in estimating the depth of the network. Based on the results, ensemble approaches like boosted decision trees(BDT) and random forrest(RF) regressor have a higher R 2 score and lower mean squared error to estimate the depth more accurately as compared to the linear models which fail to capture the variance of the attacker dataset (Table II) The estimated depth of the ensemble regressors on the target deep neural networks from the corresponding execution time on VGG based target neural network architectures is shown in Table III . Since the output of the regressor is a continuous variable, the prediction of the regressor is rounded to the nearest larger integer. For all the three neural networks used for evaluation, the regressors estimate the correct depth from the total execution time.
B. Reconstruction using Reinforcement Learning
Once the adversary has estimated the depth of the neural network, the information is used to reduce the search space. Now, the adversary has to search for the optimal substitute neural network with test accuracy close to the target neural network.
The reinforcement learning based architecture search with knowledge distillation is evaluated by fixing the depth of the model architectures inferred using the regressor. The search is further constrained by specifying the convolutional layer parameter range for the kernel size(k) {3,5} and the number of filter(n f ) {32,64,128} which are commonly used hyperparameters values used in all state of the art networks [33] . The architecture search approach explores the space of 50 models, and outputs the architecture corresponding the highest accuracy. To improve the performance of the substitute model, we use fully convolutional net architecture by replacing maxpool layer with convolutional layers with higher stride [34] . The reward used for updating the controller is the maximum validation accuracy of the last 5 epochs cubed which is clipped in the range (-0.05, 0.05) to ensure that the gradients do not overshoot. The controller RNN includes 1 LSTM cell and 32 hidden units and each proposed template model is trained for 20 epochs. For all the three model, the test accuracy of the substitute model generated is within 5% of the target model architecture as shown in Table IV .
VIII. DISCUSSION
Why does the attack work? The depth of the neural network is an important hyperparameter which determines the performance on the test data. The execution time of the neural networks adds up along the depth in sequence which results in a direct relationship between the depth of the neural network and the total execution time. This makes them vulnerable to timing side channel attacks as an attacker can infer the architecture details from the execution time of neural network.
Constant Number of Queries. For each additional query of model extraction attack proposed previously, a new bit of information is leaked which reduces the entropy of the target black box model. This however, requires a large number of queries due to the large number of parameters of deep neural network architectures. In our attack, each of the query the attacker makes during the attack phase to the target model, reveals the same bit of information(execution time averaged across all queries) which allows to make constant number of queries, independent of the architecture.
Variation Across Datasets. The timing distribution for neural networks is specific to the training data used. For the same architecture, using different datasets results in different execution time due to different number of computations as shown in Table V . The regressor is specific to a particular timing distribution unique to a dataset and a different attack model has to be trained to fit different timing distribution. Search Space. Extracting a neural network in a complete black box setting is a difficult search problem where the attacker wants to find the most optimal neural network with the target accuracy similar to the target model in a complex and large search space. While previous attack techniques assume elevated privileges and strong adversary with physical access to the hardware, they are able to reduce the search space drastically and reconstruct neural networks which are very close to the target model. Timing side channels helps the attacker to infer the depth of the neural network in constant number of queries which reveal only limited information. This results in increased cost for searching for the neural network. However, the proposed attack reduces the search space and policy gradient based architecture search makes the exploration of the complex neural network space efficient. Further, the search can be made more efficient by combining other side channel attacks to infer other architectural details and further reducing the search space.
Extending to Remote Setting. While the evaluation the attack is on a local model, this can be extended to remote setting. A round trip time model for remote timing attacks has been proposed by Crosby et al. [8] , where the total response time(t res ) is a linear function of the actual processing time(t proc ), network propagation time(t net ) and the jitter given as,
where a is a constant. This would require filtering the jitter from the roundtrip latency of sending an input and receiving the corresponding prediction using low order percentiles.
IX. RELATED WORK
Model Extraction Attacks. Model extraction attacks solve a system of linear equation with known and unknown variables using model output predictions [36] [27] . This approach, however, requires large number of queries to extract the target model and corresponding parameters. An alternative approach to extract models is by using multiple machine learning models or "metamodels" to learn the input output relation and output the corresponding model attributes. While this is done in constant number of queries, it requires to train multiple machine learning models to learn the input output mapping [29] . Instead of using model output predictions, querying model explanations like gradients can allow to infer the model architecture in lesser number of queries [28] . However, the number of queries required to infer the model attributes depends on the architecture size and the attack is not practical for large models.
Side Channel Attacks. One research direction to extract machine learning models is by exploiting side channels of the system executing the model. Side channels reveal only certain part of the secret and extracting the complete secret can be modelled as a search problem. Power consumption of the model during inference can be used to extract the model accurately by using a combination of differential power analysis and simple power analysis [5] . Since, deep neural networks follow a pattern of memory accesses owing to their computations, monitoring the memory access patterns to infer the architectural details of neural networks can help to reduce the overall search space by identifying hyperparameters [18] . However, these attacks require the adversary to have physical access to the hardware and uses additional equipment like oscilloscope and probes. Cache side channel attacks can enable adversary to identify the number of layers and other hyperparameters from the size of matrices being fetched from the memory and difference in fetching time [39] [17] . This attack assumes resource sharing in hardware and both the target and victim process should run on the same processor.
Model Extraction Defences. Several defences have been proposed to mitigate the attacks that rely on output predictions. A simple defence is to reduce information leakage from the prediction logits by clipping the confidence values at the cost of utility [36] . To prevent the loss in utility, a stateful mechanism to monitor the variation in query distribution to indicate model extraction has been proposed [20] . Lee et al. [26] add a reverse sigmoid layer to add noise to the output predicts to degrade the performance of the stolen model without varying the performance of the target model. A stateful defence can quantify the extraction status model by continuously monitoring user queries using information gain metrics and alert when the information gain is more than a given threshold [21] . Trusted hardware like Intel SGX can protect the confidentiality and integrity of the model by moving the model offline to the user's system [13] .
All the defences mentioned are proposed for attacks that use the output prediction scores but do not consider timing side channels in their threat model.
X. MITIGATION
The main reason for the manifestation of timing side channels in neural networks is the sequential computation of layers and the hyperparameters which determine the execution time. Following are possible approaches to defend against and mitigate timing attacks and side channels and design robust neural networks resistant to model extraction using the proposed attack:
Adding Noise to Execution Time. Instead of having a neural network with timing dependent on the depth of the neural network, one defence is to design neural networks without the dependency of the execution time on the number of layers and hyperparameters. This is done by including dummy computations, adding random noise and using additional layers to add latency to the neural network execution time. This approach however effects the utility and hence, resulting in a tradeoff between model privacy and the utility.
Adversarial Machine Learning. The second mechanism is a training phase defence where the attack and defence game can be viewed as an adversarial machine learning problem. The attacker is trying to fit the best possible curve on the attacker dataset of variation of execution time with neural network depth to make correct inferences. On the other hand, the defender is trying to poison the attacker dataset so that the regressor outputs wrong predictions of the network depth, hence, degrading the performance of the substitute model. This can be done by using a skewed clock in the hardware to inject adversarial data points into the attacker dataset [19] .
XI. CONCLUSION
This work shows that neural networks are vulnerable to timing side channels attacks as the total execution time depends on the sequential computation along the number of layers or depth. For a weak adversary in a black box setting, the proposed approach exploits the timing side channels to infer the depth of the neural network architecture. The evaluation of various regressors on the timing data shows that the ensemble based regressors perform better than their linear counterparts based on the R 2 score and Mean Score Error values. Further, the search problem of extracting a neural network architecture by exploiting side channels can be addressed efficiently using reinforcement learning with knowledge distillation. This approach can be used with other attacks like cache attacks and memory access pattern monitoring to accurately identify the substitute model close to the target model. The attack is evaluated on VGG like deep learning architectures and can reconstruct the model within 5% of the test accuracy of the target neural network using the proposed approach.
